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Abstract
Much of recent Trade theory focuses on heterogeneity of firms and the differential
impact trade policy might have on firms with different levels of productivity. A common
problem is that most firm level dataset do not contain information on output prices of firms
which makes it difficult to distinguish between productivity differences and differences in
market power between firms. This paper develops a new econometric framework that
allows estimating both firm specific productivity and market power in a semi-parametric
way based on a control function approach. The framework is applied to Chilean firm
level data from the early 1980, shortly after the country underwent wide ranging trade
reforms. The finding is that in all sectors of the economy market power declined and
productivity increased. In sectors with higher import penetration productivity particularly
at the bottom end of the distribution increased faster. At the same time market power
declined particularly so at the top end of the market power distribution. We also show,
that ignoring the effect on market power leads to an underestimation of the positive effects
of increased import penetration on productivity.
JEL classification: C81, D24, L11, L25
Keywords: Trade Policy, Productivity Measurement, Imperfect Competition, Pro-
ductivity Dispersion, Productivity Spread
1 Introduction
Much of recent Trade theory focuses on heterogeneity of firms and the implication this has
for trade policy (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008, Melitz 2003) Increasingly such models stress not
only interactions between trade policy and the distribution of firm level productivity but also
with the distribution of market power across firms. This poses a challenge for measurement
when using firm level production datasets. Common methods to analyse firm level productivity
require assuming perfectly competitive market structures. Almost all of the limited number of
studies that go beyond that (Klette and Griliches 1996, Melitz 2003, Martin 2008, Dobbelaere
and Mairesse 2008, de Loecker and Warzynski 2009) rely on a Dixit Stiglitz market structure
which implicitly assumes that all firms in an industry or a pre-defined group of firms1 have
∗Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics; r.martin@lse.ac.uk. Thanks to Carol
Corrado, Christos Genakos, Ron Jarmin, Steve Redding, John Van Reenen and seminar particpants at the
NBER Summer Institute, the CEP and the US Census Bureau for comments and discussions and James Tybout
for making the data available.
1For example de Loecker and Warzynski (2009) allow for different markups for the group of exporters as
opposed to non-exporting firms. Although, in a more recent version of their study they take up the idea used
in this study and originally proposed in Martin (2008) of using factor shares to control for potentially firm and
time specific markups without prior grouping.
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the same degree of market power. This is measured by the degree of markup they can charge
over their marginal costs. 2 This is clearly restrictive as it would not allow that for example a
trade reform reduces the market power of some firms whereas it increases that of others. The
contribution of this paper is to introduce a new framework for productivity estimation that
allows recovering an index of the distribution of markups across firms in addition to productivity
estimates. We achieve this by expanding on the control function approach originally introduced
by Olley and Pakes (1996) to deal with factor endogeneity in production function regressions.
The control function approach exploits assumptions about firm behaviour to recover a control
function for un-observed heterogeneity that potentially biases production function estimates.
The standard control function approach is only concerned with one type of heterogeneity: a
single index capturing Hicks neutral shifts in technical efficiency between firms. We allow in
addition that market power as measured by markups can vary arbitrarily between firms. To
control for that we introduce a second control index based on mild structural assumptions about
firm behaviour. Importantly, this requires no further assumptions about the distribution of the
parameters in the population and can therefore be used to compute the complete distribution
of market power for all firms at all points in time.
The basic idea is most easily grasped in a simple Cobb-Douglas setting with a log-linear demand
function; i.e. output quantity Qi is
Qi = AiK
γ−αL−αM
i L
αL
i M
αM
i (1)
where γ measures the returns to scale and demand is
Qi = P
−ηi
i (2)
although it can easily be extended to a very general class of production functions and demand
functions. Consider a production factor that is perfectly flexible in the short run such as
materials, Miwhere i indexes a firm. In the perfect competition case (ηi = ∞) it is a familiar
results that short run profit maximisation implies
αM =
WMMi
Qi
= sMi
i.e. the production function parameter is equal to materials share in output. With imperfect
competition this equation becomes
αM
µi
=
WMMi
Ri
= sMi (3)
where µi = 11− 1
ηi
captures the (potentially) firm specific markup parameter and output quantity
Qiis replaced by revenue Ri, which is all that we can observe in this case at the firm level. Note
that the left hand side becomes smaller compared to the perfect competition case (recall that
µi > 1). Intuitively this is because it measures the marginal benefit of increasing usage of
materials. With imperfect competition this is smaller ceteris paribus as now an increase in
materials not only increases output but also lowers the price that can be charged for this
output.
2One exception is Klette (1999) who proposes a Random Coefficients Specification. A random effect specifi-
cation would not allow to separately identify both: firm specific market power and productivity shocks. Another
exeption is Katayama et al. (2003). Their framework requires however that all firms face constant marginal
costs, thus ruling out increasing returns to scale or adjustment costs which make some factors fixed in the short
run.
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Note that 3 suggests a simple way to control for unobserved variation in µi. Simply use the
inverse revenue share as a proxy:
µi = ψ
(
sMi
)
=
αM
sMi
How can this be used in a regression setting? Using production and demand function in
equations 1 and 2 we can write (log) revenue as
lnRi =
1
µi
(αM lnMi + αL lnLi + (γ − αL − αM) lnKi + ai)
which we can re-write as
lnRi − sMi (lnMi − lnKi)− sLi (lnLi − lnKi)
sMi
=
γ
αM
ki +
ai
αM
(4)
Note that the LHS of equation can be computed directly from standard firm level productivity
data. To conduct a regression we need to take into account endogeneity from the TFP shock
ai affecting ki. This can be done by one of the standard control function approaches.3 With an
estimate of γ
αM
we can derive a TFP estimate as LHSi − γˆαM and use αˆγ s
−1
i as an index for µi.
The following section will show how this can be generalised to a general production and demand
function where αM is not necessarily constant. The two key assumptions required are that the
demand curve is downward sloping and that the production function is homothetic. A downward
sloping demand curve is a natural assumption implied by a variety of settings. Large parts of
the literature equally assume homothetic production functions even though it is potentially a
very restrictive assumption. In the current context, for example, it would rule out that some
firms adjust to trade liberalisation by outsourcing part of their production thereby becoming
more intermediate intensive. However, in appendix B we develop a way of assessing if such
concerns are important for a dataset at hand.
Another way of looking at the idea proposed in this paper is as follows: a common approach
to measure market power is to look at price margins. With constant unit costs, price costs
margins are proportional to factor shares in revenue; i.e. we can measure market power trough
factor shares. What we show in the following is then how to use price cost margins as a control
even if unit costs are not constant because the production technology is not constant returns
or because not all factors are fully flexible.
We apply this new framework to Chilean data. This is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, Chile
was subject to fundamental trade reforms in the 1970s and therefore has attracted interest in
the Trade Literature before (Pavcnik 2002). Secondly, because firm level micro data for Chile
has been relatively freely available previous studies on firm level productivity measurement
have used the country as a test case (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003).
Using the new method proposed in this paper we compute firm specific (Total Factor) Produc-
tivity and market power for Chilean manufacturing firms. We find that across manufacturing,
productivity (TFP) increased and market power declined over the sample period which is from
1979 to 1986. Comparing sectors with high import penetration to those with lower import
penetration we find that, productivity increased whereas market power declined by more than
in sectors with low import penetration. The productivity effect appears stronger at the bottom
of the productivity distribution whereas the increase in market power is more pronounced at
the top of the market power distribution. Ignoring the market power effect thus leads to an
under-estimation of the productivity effects of higher import penetration.
3Using sMi as additional state variable in the proxy function, that is.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the new framework
for firm level market power and productivity estimation. Section 3 contains a basic description
of the dataset used, Section 4 reports results, Section 5 concludes.
2 An augmented control function approach
Suppose there is a representative consumer deriving utility from m differentiated products
U = U
(
Q˜, Y
)
(5)
where Q˜ is a m× 1 vector of effective units of the goods consumed, Y is income and U (·, Y )is
a differentiable, non convex function.
Q˜i = ΛiQi
i.e. Λi is a specific utility shock derived from consumption of good i.
Further suppose that each of the m products is produced by a single producer. Caplin and
Nalebuff (1991) derive conditions under which this leads to downward sloping demand curves
for a specific producer i conditional on the actions of the other producers. They show that this
is the case under a wide variety of market structures.
Qi = Di (Pi,Λi) (6)
For a production factor X that can be adjusted instantly in response to demand or supply
shocks, short run profit maximisation implies4
∂lnFi
∂lnXi
1
µi
= sxi (7)
where Fiis a homogeneous of degree γ production function,
Fi = Ai [f (Xi)]
γ
sx is the revenue share of expenditure on factor X and µi = 11− 1
ηi
with ηi = −∂lnD(Pi)∂lnPi measuring
elasticity of demand for producer i with. Producers revenue can be written as a function of
inputs demand and supply shocks (as well as non firm specific variables which we suppress)
Ri = Pi (Qi (Xi, Ai) ,Λi)Qi
Letting xi the log deviation of a variable Xi from a reference firm M5 - i.e. xi = lnXi− lnXM -
we can invoke the mean value theorem (Baily et al. 1992, Klette 1996, Martin 2008)
ri =
∑
X
ρ¯xi xi + ρ¯
Λ
i λ+ ρ¯
A
i ai + ηi (8)
4i.e. maxX 6=K
{
QiPi −
∑
X 6=K XiW
X
}
implies the following first order condition ∂Qi∂XiPi +
∂Pi
∂Mi
Qi =WX
which we can re-write as ∂Qi∂XiPi
(
1 + ∂Pi∂Qi
Qi
P
)
=WX . Because 6 is downward sloping and therefore invertible
we get ∂Pi∂Qi
Qi
P = − 1ηi with ηi = −
∂lnD(Pi)
∂lnPi
the price elasticity of demand. Multiplying the first order conditions
by XiQi we then get
∂Qi
∂Xi
Xi
Qi
(
1− 1ηi
)
= W
XXi
PiQi
which is the condition in equation 7.
5e.g. the median firm in terms of some variable.
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where ρXi =
∂lnRi
∂lnXi
and ρ¯Xi ≈
ρXi +ρ
X
M
2
; i.e. the mean value theorem suggest that 8ρ¯Xi ∈
[
ρXi , ρ
X
M
]
.
We follow common practice by approximating this by averaging across the derivative at firms
i and M. We introduce an iid shock ηi allowing for the fact that the mean value theorem and
our way of approximating might only hold approximately.
Note that ∂lnRi
∂lnXi
= ∂lnFi
∂lnXi
(
∂lnPi
∂lnQi
+ 1
)
= ∂lnFi
∂lnXi
1
µi
= sxi for flexible factors. Similarly ∂lnRi∂lnAi =
1
µi
.
Assume there is one fixed factor K. Then
∂lnRi
∂lnKi
=
γ
µi
−
∑
x6=K
sXi
Finally, because D (·) is monotone in P and demand shocks are ”consumption augmenting” we
get that6
∂lnRi
∂lnλi
=
1
µi
(9)
Consequently we can write
ri −
∑
X 6=K
s¯Xi (xi − ki) = r˜i = γ 1
µi
ki +
1
µi
(λi + ai) + η˜i (10)
Now, from Equation 7 we see that
1
µi
= sxi
(
∂lnFi
∂lnXi
)−1
= sxiΨ (Xi) (11)
i.e. because the productivity shock is Hicks neutral, the (inverse of) firm level markups can
be expressed as the product of factor shares and a function of observable factor inputs only.
While Ψ (·) is not known we can specify a general functional form and let it be determined by
the data. We can combine this with the usual strategy of a proxy variable for TFP7 (Olley
and Pakes 1996, Levinsohn and Petrin 2003, Bond and Söderbom 2005, Martin 2008). Martin
(2008) shows that conditional on markups TFP can be expressed as a function of net revenue
and capital. Now, the factor share of a variable factor becomes an additional argument in
this function to control for varying degrees of market power between firms. Thus in terms of
deviation from a reference firm we can write
ωit = φω (kit, kM , lnΠit, lnΠM , sxi, sxM)
Finally assume that ω is driven by a Markov Process8 so that
ωit = g
(
ωit−1, ωit−1
)
+ νit
where g (·) = Et−1 {ωit} and ωit = λit+ait . Further, ωit−1 is a threshold value that summarises
the firm’s rule regarding exiting.
We can now specify a 3 stage regression procedure similar to Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), Bond and Söderbom (2005), Martin (2008). First, to control for exit we
conduct a probit regression on a dummy indicating if a firm exits the following period:
6See appendix A for more details.
7In the remainder I refer to the sum of technology and demand shock - ω = a + λ -as TFP for simplicity.
See Martin (2008) for an depth discussion of this.
8This follows the common assumption in the literature but is not a necessary assumption here.
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Pit = P (lnXit−1, lnXMt−1,sxit−1, sxMt−1, lnΠit−1, lnΠMt−1, t)
This yields an predicted exit probability Pˆit which we can use in subsequent stages to control
for the un-observed exit threshold, ωit−1 . Next to smooth the shock η˜i in Equation 10 we can
run the following regression
r˜it = φr (lnXit, lnXMt,sxit, sxMt, lnΠit, lnΠMt) + η˜it (12)
where φr (·) is an arbitrary function approximated by a polynomial.
Finally, we can devise a number of moment conditions to recover Ψ (·) and in turn indices of
relative productivity and relative markups. For that purpose notice that conditional on trial
values for the parameters that define Ψ (·) we can compute an estimate of ωit over γ as
ωˆit
γ
=
φˆrit
gµ (lnXit, lnXM0,sxit, sxM0)
− kit (13)
where φˆrit is an estimate of φr (·) derived from the second stage in Equation 12 and
gµ (lnXit, lnXMt,sxit, sxM0) =
γ
2
[sxitΨ (lnXit) + sxM0Ψ (lnXM0)] (14)
Using the estimates of ωit we can recover estimates of the shocks νit using a regression of the
following equation:
ωˆit
γ
= g˜
(
ωˆit−1
γ
, Pˆit
)
+ νit (15)
where g˜ (·) is version of g (·) accounting for the fact that we re-scaled ωit using the constant
scale parameter γ.
The shock νit are independent of all variables determined before period t. We assume that
this includes kit ; i.e. capital that is productive in period t has been determined before νit re-
alises.9 We can then use the following moment restrictions involving νit to identify all remaining
parameters:
E
{[
Xit−1 × kit
]′
νit
}
= 0 (16)
i.e. to identify Ψ (·) we use the zero moment conditions from the interaction of current levels
of capital with lagged levels of all production factors. Note that we cannot use conditions on
lagged production factor variables without interaction, as these have already been exploited in
the regression implied by Equation 15.
Finally, recall that the focus of this estimation framework is to derive firm specific TFP and
markup estimates. We get those by evaluating equations 14 and 13 at the parameter values
that solve 16.
9Again this is a common assumption in the literature.
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3 Data
We are using a dataset that been used in a series of papers before (Pavcnik 2002, Levinsohn
and Petrin 2003). The reader should refer to those papers for a more in depth description of the
dataset. Interest in this data is sparked both because Chile has been subject to fundamental
trade reforms in the 1970s10 and because data from the Chilean Census of Businesses has been
relatively freely available. Clearly, it would be good to compare outcomes from before to those
from after these trade reforms were implemented. Unfortunately such data is not available at
the micro level. Similar to Pavcnik (2002) we therefore look at trends over the sample period.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics by year. We see that using various measures of size -
revenue, employment or capital - the size of the average firm increased over the sample period.
Equally, labour productivity - measured as value added per employee increased dramatically
4 Results for Chile
4.1 The distribution of markups and TFP
Figures 1 and 2 shows density estimates of markups and TFP - λ+ a - relative to the median
firm in terms of revenue per employee in 1979.
µ˜ = lnµit − lnµM (17)
Density estimates are reported separately for sectors with high and low rates of import pene-
tration as well as for the earlier and later years of the sample period. Following Pavcnik (2002)
we code a (3 digit) sector with an import penetration of more than 15% as being highly exposed
to foreign imports. We can see that for both, sectors with high and low import penetration the
density curve shifts to the left in the later period in Figure 1. Contrarily, for TFP in Figure
2 we see that both distributions shift to the right suggesting that TFP increases. To examine
if these shifts are significant we run quantile regressions for both variables on a set of dummy
variables that distinguish between the various cases reported in Figures 1 and 2. That is we
run regressions of the following form:
yit = β>83I {t > 1983}+ βHighHighS(i) + εit (18)
where yit ∈ {µ˜it, ωit} and HighS(i) = 1 if the three digit sector firm i belongs to has an import
penetration of 15% or more. The first panel of Table 3 reports results for market power. We
see that at various points in the distribution the coefficients of the interaction between the post
83 indicator and the “High” dummy are negative, implying that in sectors with high import
penetration the decline in market power is stronger. The difference is larger and statistically
more significant at higher points in the distribution. In the second panel of Table 3 we report the
same quantile regressions for TFP. Again we find that there is a significant difference between
sectors with high and low import penetration in the later years. Firm level productivity in
sectors with high import penetration increases significantly more. The effect appears slightly
stronger at the bottom of the distribution.
If market power and thus output prices decline while TFP increases, measuring TFP with
revenue based output measures should lead to an underestimate of the TFP increase. We can
confirm this by conducting the same analysis as above, yet imposing a constant markup. Table
4reports the results. We see that at various points in the distribution TFP still increases by
10Reforms which have been brought about by a highly repressive and un-democratic regime.
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more in sectors with high import penetration. However, the effects are much smaller than in
Table 3. For example at the median (p50) we find an increase of 11.3 percentage points in
Table 3 whereas the same value is 4.3 percentage points in Table 4.
We might also ask if the reduction in market power could have been detected more simply.
For that purpose, Figure 3 reports similar density plots as before for the price cost margin
estimated as revenue over variable costs. As in Equation 17 we report the log deviation from
the the median firm in the base year. As discussed in the introduction, this is an index of firm
level market power under the assumption that the production technology is Cobb-Douglas. The
density plot makes apparent that rather than a decline in market power - as found in before -
this would suggest that market power increased. An implication of this is, which we can derive
from Equation 7, is that the marginal productivity of the variable factors must have declined.11
Potentially, this could be explained by a reduction in capital stocks.
4.2 The relationship between markups and TFP
Figure 4 explores the relationship between TFP and markups in a scatter plot. Fitting a
regression line confirms that the relationship is significantly positive; i.e. firms with higher TFP
charge higher markups. Notice however that the fitted regression line is rather flat compared
to the 45 degree line. This suggests that on average the TFP gain is higher than the increase in
markups so that we would expect that firms with higher TFP charge lower prices dispite having
higher markups. In other words: they pass on most but not all of their higher productivity
increase to consumers.
In the scatter plot, straight crosses indicate the earlier (79-83) period whereas diagonal crosses
represent the later (84-86) period. It is striking that in the earlier period there are a number of
firms with relatively low TFP but high market power. Over time this case seems to disappear,
which is consistent with our understanding of the impact of trade reforms.
Figure 5 as well as Table 5 explore the impact on prices further by looking at the impact of
trade reform on prices. Thus, we compute the percentage deviation from the median firm in
terms of markups minus the percentage deviation in terms of TFP to derive an index of the
firm level price relative to the median firm. As before we report density plots as well as quantile
regressions. We find that sectors with higher import penetration had a stronger price decline.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a new structural approach to production function estimation that can
recover both, estimates of firm specific TFP as well as market power. While structural, the
assumptions needed are very mild compared to what is often assumed in the literature. The
method is of interest in any situation where firm level productivity is estimated with revenue
rather than quantity information which is almost always the case. In this paper we apply
it to study the impact of trade reforms in Chile in the 1970s. We find that in sectors with
higher import penetration market power decreased and productivity increased. Importantly,
the increase in productivity is under-estimated if the market power effects are ignored.
11Recall that the factor share is the inverse of the price cost margin measure used in Figure 3
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A The response of prices to quality shocks
This section works out the response of prices and revenue to quality shocks Λi; i.e. it proves
the result stated in equation 9 implying that quality shocks affect revenue in the same way as
Hick’s neutral TFP shocks. This allows us to combine TFP and quality shocks and separate
them from firms specific demand factors affecting markups.
Suppose consumers maximise a general differentiable utility function subject to budget M :
max
Q
{
U
(
Q˜
)
− κ
(∑
i
QiPi −M
)}
where κ is a Lagrange multiplier and Q˜ is a vector of elements ΛiQi. The first order conditions
of this problem imply
∂U
∂Q˜i
∂Q˜i
∂Qi
=
∂U
∂Q˜i
Λi = κPi
Taking logs implies
ln
∂U
∂Q˜i
+ λi = lnκ+ lnPi (19)
Solving all these conditions will give us demand functions for all products including that of firm
i. Even if we knew the exact form of U (·) this might be tricky to work out. Notice, however
what 19 tells us about the shape of demand function. Differentiating w.r.t to lnQi yields
∂lnPi
∂lnQi
= − 1
ηi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂lnQ˜i
∂lnQ˜i
∂lnQi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂lnQ˜i
Similarly we find that
∂lnPi
∂λi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂lnQ˜i
∂lnQ˜i
∂λi
+ 1 =
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂lnQ˜i
+ 1
i.e. the elasticity of prices with respect to output quantity differs from the elasticity of prices
w.r.t to the quality shock by one. Moreover, because of the demand function is invertible we
get
∂lnPi
∂λi
= 1− 1
ηi
=
1
µi
B Testing the validity of the homogeneity assumption
As discussed in the main text, homogeneity of the production function is a key assumption of
the proposed estimation approach. While this is an explicit or implicit assumption widely made
in the literature this does not necessarily mean it is reasonable. An example of why it might
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Table 1: R2 across 3 digit sectors
Percentiles
Sample mean min p5 p10 p20 p40
Across firms 0.90 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.92
Across Sectors 0.89 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.88
Notes: The table shows statistics of R2 of regressions of equation 20 at each 3 digit sector. The
statistics in in row 1 are weighted by the number of firms in a sector whereas row 2 reports unweighted
statistics across 3 digit sectors.
no hold is the following: suppose that after a change in trade policy some firms respond by
out-sourcing parts of their production. Therefore, to examine its validity of the homogeneity
assumption we propose the following. Above we derived that under homogeneity factor shares
of variable factors are equal to a function of observable production factors divided by markups.
We can therefore model deviations from this assumption by writing e.g. for materials
smi =
Ψm (Xi)
µi
Ξmi
where ΞMi measures firm specific deviations from this assumption. If we have at least one other
variable factor - labour say - we can write
ln smi − ln sli = ln Ψm (Xi)− ln ΨL (Xi) + ξmi − ξli (20)
where ξXi = ln ΞXi. Hence the log difference in factor share of two variable factors becomes a
function of observable variables and any homogeneity destroying shocks. Hence, to examine the
validity of the homogeneity assumption we can run regressions of equation 20. If homogeneity
is a reasonable assumption, most of the variation in the share difference should be explained by
the function of observables.12 In other words, we can look at the R2 statistic which should be
rather high. Table 1 reports statistics of R2 computed for each 3 digit sector after regressing
equation 20 with the Chilean data.13 Row 1 of the table reports statistics weighted with the
number of firms in a sector whereas row 2 reports unweighted statistics. We see that no sector
has an R2 lower than 71%. The majority of firms in the sample are in a sector with R2 larger
than 90%.
C Tables and Figures
12Although we should note that this a necessary although not sufficient condition. Our test would bear no
power if ξm and ξl are perfectly negatively correlated.
13We used a simple non-linear least squares approach. A more sophisticated appraoch would consider various
assumption about the dynamics and correlation of the the ξ shocks with the observed explanatory variables.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by year
variable year mean p10 p50 p90 count
Revenue
79 66515 293998 4070 13056 133586 2958
80 89484 377169 5554 17915 176633 3146
81 114000 * 421073 6635 22480 233638 3069
82 116632 * 553747 6035 21259 229204 2709
83 164288 *** 743369 8448 28628 341316 2476
84 233704 *** 1082926 11005 40297 479047 2390
85 353063 *** 1599479 16557 59780 734565 2346
86 503219 *** 2150605 22173 84936 1067461 2133
Employment
79 53 100 12 23 108 2958
80 54 105 12 23 113 3146
81 56 108 12 24 122 3069
82 51 97 11 23 107 2709
83 53 99 11 24 113 2476
84 58 * 104 12 26 126 2390
85 63 *** 111 12 28 138 2346
86 71 *** 119 13 30 167 2133
Capital
79 36657 178514 977 4364 56753 2958
80 37412 198003 1015 4230 54298 3146
81 41972 211392 1053 4299 59745 3069
82 47967 * 236453 1089 4455 68924 2709
83 48960 ** 255152 1058 4491 68980 2476
84 51063 ** 252865 1077 4427 77310 2390
85 52088 ** 253663 1078 4542 78762 2346
86 53813 *** 245613 1079 4511 89680 2133
79 375 424 97 247 784 2958
80 531 *** 613 130 351 1097 3146
81 672 *** 775 170 441 1419 3069
82 734 *** 945 180 451 1537 2709
83 910 *** 1145 199 532 1980 2476
84 1120 *** 1514 237 641 2456 2390
85 1541 *** 2111 319 853 3406 2346
86 1970 *** 2832 396 1068 4265 2133
79 1.66 0.56 1.13 1.52 2.36 2958
80 1.67 0.53 1.14 1.54 2.39 3146
81 1.64 0.51 1.12 1.51 2.37 3069
82 1.64 0.51 1.13 1.51 2.32 2709
83 1.6 *** 0.52 1.11 1.47 2.24 2476
84 1.57 *** 0.48 1.13 1.45 2.18 2390
85 1.58 *** 0.47 1.13 1.46 2.18 2346
86 1.57 *** 0.49 1.13 1.44 2.19 2133
sd
Value added 
per employee
Price Cost 
Margins 
(Revenue over 
Material and 
Labour Costs)
Notes: Stars indicate if the mean for a specific year is significantly different from that for the first year.
*,**,***=significant at 10, 5, 1%.
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Table 3: Quantile Regressions of Markups and Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percentile: 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
Post 83 Dummy -0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.020*** -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.030***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
-0.000 -0.003 -0.014* -0.010 -0.026*** -0.021** -0.025**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Post 83 Dummy 0.040** 0.054*** 0.040*** 0.018 0.015 -0.011 -0.016
(0.020) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022)
0.137*** 0.119*** 0.127*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.085**
(0.032) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028) (0.034)
Observations 16362 16362 16362 16362 16362 16362 16362
Markup ln(μ(i)-μ(Median))
Post 83 X High Import 
Penetration
Combined TFP and demand shock ω
Post 83 X High Import 
Penetration
Notes: The table reports results from quantile regressions as described in Equation 18.
Table 4: Quantile Regressions of Productivity imposing constant markups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percentile: 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
Post 83 Dummy 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.016
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
-0.007 0.008 0.038** 0.043*** 0.041** 0.039 0.079***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.024) (0.029)
Observations 16362 16362 16362 16362 16362 16362 16362
Combined TFP and demand shock ω
Post 83 X High Import 
Penetration
Notes: The table reports results from quantile regressions as described in Equation 18. The dependant
variable is a TFP measure obtained with a control function approach where markups are restricted to
be constant.
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Table 5: Quantile Regressions of the net effect on prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Percentile: 5 10 25 50 75 90 95
Post 83 Dummy -0.007 0.012 -0.028** -0.039*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.073***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.025)
-0.092*** -0.123*** -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.149*** -0.174*** -0.148***
(0.031) (0.027) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.040)
Observations 16364 16364 16364 16364 16364 16364 16364
Prices ln(μ(i)-μ(Median))-ω
Post 83 X High Import 
Penetration
Notes: The table reports results from quantile regressions as described in Equation 18. The dependant
variable is an index of the output price computed as the sum of (log) markup minus TFP, all relative
to the reference firm.
Table 6: Transitions in the market power distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable High Markup Indicator (above median) in t+4
Incumbent Firm (Established before 1980) 0.040 -0.033 -0.019 -0.021
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
High Import Penetration (above 15%) 0.101 -0.091 -0.152** -0.116
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.075)
Incumbent Firm X High Import Penetration -0.105 -0.005 -0.018 -0.015
(0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
High Markup (above median) 0.511*** 0.523*** 0.631***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.030)
High Markup X High Import Penetration 0.164*** 0.142*** 0.037
(0.043) (0.044) (0.063)
High TFP (above median) -0.107*** 0.009
(0.025) (0.037)
High TFP X High Import Penetration 0.146*** 0.113*
(0.042) (0.064)
High TFP X High Markup -0.218***
(0.049)
0.099
(0.085)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sample 1980-82 1980-82 1980-82 1980-82
Observations 4336 4336 4336 4336
High TFP X High Markup X High Import Penet.
Notes: The table reports probit regressions on the event that a firm is in the upper half of the market
power distribution after 1983. The explanatory variables include dummies regarding the state of a firm
4 years earlier.
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Table 7: Transitions in the TFP distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable High TFP Indicator (above median) in t+4
Incumbent Firm (Established before 1980) 0.007 0.017 -0.042 -0.041
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
High Import Penetration (above 15%) -0.244*** -0.349*** -0.340*** -0.402***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067)
Incumbent Firm X High Import Penetration -0.009 -0.010 0.045 0.047
(0.071) (0.071) (0.073) (0.073)
High Markup (above median) -0.079*** -0.147*** -0.217***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.039)
High Markup X High Import Penetration 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.322***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.046)
High TFP (above median) 0.418*** 0.368***
(0.022) (0.031)
High TFP X High Import Penetration 0.102** 0.253***
(0.040) (0.051)
High TFP X High Markup 0.114**
(0.048)
-0.297***
(0.070)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sample 1980-82 1980-82 1980-82 1980-82
Observations 4336 4336 4336 4336
High TFP X High Markup X High Import Penet.
Notes: The table reports probit regressions on the event that a firm is in the upper half of the TFP
distribution after 1983. The explanatory variables include dummies regarding the state of a firm 4
years earlier.
Table 8: Exit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Exit Indicator in t+4
Incumbent Firm (Established before 1980) -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.152*** -0.153***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
High Import Penetration (above 15%) 0.099** 0.082* 0.038 0.038
(0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050)
Incumbent Firm X High Import Penetration -0.055 -0.055 -0.070 -0.067
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
High Markup (above median) -0.013 -0.003 0.066**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.030)
High Markup X High Import Penetration 0.033 0.027 0.016
(0.031) (0.031) (0.042)
High TFP (above median) -0.124*** -0.067**
(0.019) (0.027)
High TFP X High Import Penetration 0.084*** 0.123***
(0.032) (0.047)
High TFP X High Markup -0.113***
(0.035)
-0.051
(0.057)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Sample 1980-82 1980-82 1980-82 1980-82
Observations 4336 4336 4336 4336
High TFP X High Markup X High Import Penet.
Notes: The table reports probit regressions on the event that a firm exits within 4 years. The explana-
tory variables include dummies regarding the state of a firm 4 years earlier.
14
Figure 1: The distribution of market power
Notes: The figure shows kernel density plots of the distribution of market power, separately
for import intensive and non import intensive sectors as well as for the earlier and later
sample period.
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Figure 2: The distribution of Productivity
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Figure 3: Revenue over variable costs
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Figure 4: Markups vs TFP
Notes: The figures shows a scatter plot of firm level markups on firm level TFP. Earlier values
are represented by blue crosses, later values by red x’s. The red vertical and horizontal
lines indicate the median. The graph also contains linear regressions lines separately for
the earlier and later period. This suggest that the positive relationship between markups
and TFP become stronger over time.
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Figure 5: Net effect on prices
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